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CONGREVE’S COMMON PASSIONS:  
HUMOR, AFFECTATION AND THE WORK OF SATIRE 
Rebecca Tierney-Hynes 
 
 In 1698, William Congreve’s irritable response to Jeremy Collier protests the naïve 
equivalency Collier drew between the playwright and his immoral characters: “it were very 
hard,” he complains, “that a Painter should be believ’d to resemble all the ugly Faces that he 
draws” (2011a, 9). Congreve’s deployment of the proverbial analogy between painting and 
poetry1 stakes his central claim for the significance of satire: that it paints the world in sharp and 
truthful outline. A “Satyrical Wit” he observes in 1695, “Observes, and shews things as they are” 
(2011b, 3: 66). In the same year, in Love for Love, Congreve’s sharp-tongued observer, Scandal, 
boasts that he “can shew you your own Picture, and most of your Acquaintance to the Life, and 
as like as at Knellers2” (1967, 232; I.i.617-9).3 Valentine, Congreve’s rake-hero and Scandal’s 
friend, declares that “indeed, he speaks truth now. . . . he has the Pictures of all that have refus’d 
him: If Satyrs, Descriptions, Characters and Lampoons are Pictures.” Scandal responds:  
                                                 
Many thanks to the anonymous readers of this essay, whose time and care made this a much 
better piece. 
1 See, for an influential contemporary discussion of this classical analogy (ut pictura poesis), 
Dryden’s essay, “A Parallel betwixt Painting and Poetry.” Though it is primarily focused later in 
the century, see also Hagstrum’s Sister Arts. 
2 Godfrey Kneller’s Academy in Great Queen Street. Kneller (later, Sir Godfrey Kneller, bart.) 
was the principal portraitist of his day. For the connection between Kneller and Congreve, see 
Julie Stone Peters’s Congreve, the Drama, and the Printed Word. 
3 All following parenthetical citations of Congreve’s plays refer to this 1967 Chicago edition by 
Herbert Davis. I have chosen not to use D.F. McKenzie’s 2011 Oxford edition of Congreve’s 
works to cite the text of his plays, though I have used it for the prose works. McKenzie’s edition 
prioritizes Congreve’s engagement with print culture, and thus uses the heavily edited and 
polished 1710 Plays as its source text. Davis’s edition uses source text much closer to 
Congreve’s plays as they were first performed. 
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Yes, mine are most in black and white.—And yet there are some set out in their true 
Colours, both Men and Women. I can shew you Pride, Folly, Affectation, Wantonness, 
Inconstancy, Covetousness, Dissimulation, Malice, and Ignorance, all in one Piece. Then I 
can shew you Lying, Foppery, Vanity, Cowardice, Bragging, Lechery, Impotence, and 
Ugliness in another Piece; and yet one of these is a celebrated Beauty, and t’other a profest 
Beau. (1967, 233; I.i.622-33) 
Scandal’s plain speaking – he sketches in sharp contrasts, and in the “black and white” of cheap 
engravings as well as in “Paintings” (233; I.i.634)4 – aligns one of the truisms of eighteenth-
century literary criticism with the observational drive of empiricism. Scandal’s taxonomic 
approach5 lists qualities and characters rather than appearances, which might seem to set him 
apart from empirical observation. But one of the principal insights of the late seventeenth-century 
scientific revolution was that observation alone was insufficient to assess the world. Tools, both 
mechanical and theoretical, help us both to make and to interpret these observations. Natural 
philosophy in this moment revealed, above all, the hidden life of things.6 Essential qualities and 
characteristics invisible to the naked eye appeared under Leeuwenhoek’s microscope; Locke’s 
inward eye surveyed what passed inside the mind; and Newton’s mathematics predicted the 
motion of celestial bodies both unseen and threatening.7 As much as it ordered the world we see, 
                                                 
4 See Julie Stone Peters’s Congreve, the Drama, and the Printed Word, chapter 5: “Scandal’s 
Portraits: Engravings and Visual Imitation,” on engraving, wood cuts, and the circulation of 
cheap print materials. 
5 Foucault famously named taxonomy as the Enlightenment episteme in The Order of Things. 
Refinements and critiques of his thesis have, for the most part, upheld the sense that this new 
fashion of ordering the world was an essential contribution of the scientific revolution. See, for 
example, Ian Hacking’s Taming of Chance. See also Peters, Congreve, 135. 
6 See Helen Thompson’s Fictional Matter, in which she argues the centrality of invisible causes 
to the structure of both modern science and the novel.  
7 Newton’s predictions about the orbit of Halley’s comet led to the publication of the Principia 
(1687).  
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empirical science and philosophy revealed the fabric of an invisible world. When Locke 
imagines, for example, a man with “Microscopical Eyes,” he pinpoints his ability to see “into the 
secret Composition, and radical Texture of Bodies” (1975; II.xxiii.12).8 In this context, Congreve 
takes up literature’s long-standing capacity to reveal our inward motions as a sign of its 
fundamental kinship with the aims of Lockean empiricism. While experimental philosophy 
uncovered the nature of nature, literature and philosophy together uncovered the nature of human 
nature.   
Congreve’s comic theory thus draws together the relatively new sensationalist model of 
the psyche proposed by Locke in 16909 and older theories of the humors and the passions. In the 
process, he moves from a vocal effort, in 1695, to sustain humors comedy, to a new examination 
affectation in 1700. His letter to John Dennis on humors comedy insists, with ever-increasing 
specificity, on the definition of a humors character and the status of the humors as central to 
comic theory, though he leaves open the possibility that affectation might provide valuable comic 
material: “I don’t say but that very entertaining and useful Characters, and proper for Comedy, 
may be drawn from Affectations, and those other Qualities, which I have endeavoured to 
distinguish from Humour.” However, he is firm in his ranking of humor above these other 
sources of comedy, declaring that he “would not have such imposed on the World for Humour, 
nor esteem’d of equal Value with it” (2011b, 3: 66). In his dedication to The Way of the World, 
                                                 
8 Lorraine Daston remarks that the “peculiar economy of attention cultivated by the 
Enlightenment naturalists was pointillist, magnifying, and therefore deliberately repetitive. 
Visually and intellectually, the observer pulverized the object into a mosaic of details” (99). 
Thompson also finds this description compelling, arguing that Locke is pointing, here, to the ever 
present impact on us of the world’s fabric, regardless of our capacity to apprehend it (86-7). 
9 Congreve’s engagement with empiricism has long been recognized. See Holland 1959 and 
Jarvis 1972. Locke’s Essay was a direct influence. There are suggestive echoes of Locke’s 
language in Congreve’s Amendments of Mr. Collier’s False and Imperfect Citations (1698), and 
in Love for Love (1695), and the third edition of Locke’s Essay Concerning Human 
Understanding is catalogued in his library. See Congreve 2011c, 3:513.  
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just five years later, he says he is interested in examining “an affected Wit; a Wit, which at the 
same time that it is affected, is also false” (1967, 390). He also makes a notorious distinction 
between a “Witwoud” and a “Truewit” here. Congreve’s Witwoud is a response to Jonson’s 
Truewit in Epicoene (1616) – his affectation of wit makes him the obverse of Jonson’s humorous 
Truewit.10 Congreve pays homage to, yet simultaneously refuses the humors comedy context of 
Jonson’s Epicoene, creating a contrasting character who embodies the empty mimicry of wit that 
seems to him to be ubiquitous in the 1690s. Congreve manages, in representing “affected Wit” in 
The Way of the World, to send up his dramatic contemporaries; to affiliate himself with Jonson; 
to forge a new rationale for satire; and to raise the profile of wit comedy. His reassessment of the 
work of satire contributes to eighteenth-century comic developments: the rise of sentimentalism 
and the new theoretical commitment to comic amelioration rather than satiric excoriation.11 But 
his new model of satire also reconfigures the self, insisting simultaneously on its Lockean origins 
and on its inherently emotional foundations, prefiguring philosophical models like Hutcheson’s, 
Malebranche’s, Hume’s, and Smith’s that married the passions to the groundwork of empiricist 
cognition, producing the eighteenth-century structure of sympathy.12 Congreve’s transition from 
humors to affectation is a broader transition from one model of the psyche to another. The one, 
with a long history in the English literary tradition, is the humoral model. The other is empiricist. 
The first is expressive; the second, mimetic.  
From Humor to Affectation: 
                                                 
10 Jonson’s is the dominant theory of humors comedy at the end of the seventeenth century. In 
addition to Congreve’s admiring mention of Jonson in his letter “Concerning Humour in 
Comedy” (2011b, 3: 65-7), two expensive folio editions of Jonson’s Works appear in his library 
(2011c, 3: 509). Congreve is associated more closely with the “wit” comedy of the Fletcherian 
tradition than with Jonsonian humors comedy, but he nonetheless uses the stronger theoretical 
tradition associated with the humors to ground his critical writing. 
11 See Corman 1993. 
12 See Plamper 2015, 22-3 and Dixon 2006, esp. chapter 3: “From Movements to Mechanisms.” 
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Empiricism is usually characterized as having to do with an exhaustive focus on sensory 
data. Until fairly recently, a narrative of the empiricist self as closed, contained, carefully 
bounded and disciplined was standard. More recent assessments have interrogated this narrative, 
proposing an eighteenth-century self characterized by permeability, instability, and 
incoherence.13 For Congreve, the fascination of empiricism consisted in its ability to reduce the 
significance of the boundary between mind and matter, self and other, to make common the 
experience of multiple observers, and to open the self to impression. Congreve’s empiricist self 
prefigures the confusion of surfaces and depths that will come to characterize theories of 
sympathy.14 In Love for Love, Valentine, in his pretended madness, calls Angelica “the reflection 
of Heav’n in a Pond, and he that leaps at you is sunk” (1967, 292; IV.i.636-7). Angelica is both a 
“reflection” and a pool. She is simultaneously surface and depth, above and below, truth (heaven) 
and artifice (its picture). Congreve brings together here Milton’s image of Eve gazing at herself 
in “a liquid plain . . . Pure as the expanse of heaven” (1968, 639; PL 4, ll. 455-6) and Locke’s 
analogy of mind and mirror (1975, 118; II.i.25). Valentine continues: “You are all white, a sheet 
of lovely spotless Paper, when you first are Born; but you are to be scrawl’d and blotted by every 
Goose’s Quill” (1967, 292; IV.i.637-9). Valentine deliberately yokes specifically textual and 
literary metaphors – a blot, a quill; a mirrored pool – to two of Locke’s most famous metaphors 
                                                 
13 Critics are increasingly aware of the permeability of the empiricist self. See, for example, 
Cathy Caruth’s early contribution to this discussion, Empirical Truths and Critical Fictions, 
Adela Pinch’s Strange Fits of Passion, and Jonathan Kramnick’s Actions and Objects. Of 
common interpretations of Locke’s epistemology, Kramnick writes: “the story about 
epistemology tends to look at the first two books of the Essay, and to emphasize on that basis a 
model of self-enclosure and inwardness [whereas] the story I would tell about consciousness and 
persons looks also at the later parts of the Essay and has a more ontological bent. How does 
consciousness arise from matter, and where are we to locate the sources and limits of actions?” 
(2010, 97). 
14 See Pinch 1996. 
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of the mind.15 For Congreve, making art and making a self are analogous processes. 
Congreve is mostly interested in the intersection of the old terms of comic art – the 
humors, ridicule, wit – with modern models of the self. His 1695 letter to John Dennis 
“Concerning Humour in Comedy” is really an essay about shifting the humors – which explain 
psychology by physical pathology – to something closer to an individualistic theory of 
personality. He begins by working with the seventeenth-century commonplace about humor: that 
it refers to personal peculiarities. But he renovates this theory of antisocial behavior in the 
service of the newly emphatic individualism of the eighteenth century to make, finally, a pseudo-
nationalist claim about the ways in which English “liberty” produces a heterogeneous, and 
therefore sociable nation.16 Oddly, though humor is an expression of problematic English 
peculiarity, a call to satirize it was also a nationalistic rallying-point.  
Affectation and hypocrisy, however, the common targets of late seventeenth-century 
comic ridicule, are terms that fit somewhat uneasily into the humors comedy frequently lauded as 
the comic ideal.17 While humors comedy, at least in theory, targets the expression of personal 
peculiarities, hypocrisy and affectation are forms of disguise; by definition, they prevent the 
expression of the genuine self with its individual oddities.18 Congreve is concerned to untangle 
                                                 
15 Locke also compares the mind to “white Paper” (1975, 104; II.i.2). 
16 For a discussion of the relationship between humors and English liberty, and its evolution over 
the course of the eighteenth century, see Freeman 2002, 209-10.  
17 See, for example, Shadwell’s preface to The Sullen Lovers (1668). Dryden, who quarrels with 
Shadwell’s rigidity and champions Shakespeare over Jonson in his Essay of Dramatick Poesie 
(1668), nonetheless holds up Jonson as “the more correct Poet” (1971, 58) and Congreve, though 
qualifying his praise, declares that he “cannot enough admire [Ben Jonson], for his great Mastery 
of true Humour in Comedy” (2011b, 3: 65). See Corman 1984. 
18 Realizing the difficulty of promoting as a comic ideal a model of comic character that refuses 
the possibility of amelioration – if humors are natural and inborn, they’re not our fault, and 
comedy that attempts to purge them is cruel to “silly folly” which is a “natural imperfection” 
(1966, 4) – Shadwell tries with a notable lack of success to promote the idea that humor is just a 
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these terms of art, developing a kind of taxonomy of comic terminology. Carefully distinguishing 
humor from wit, unnatural folly, “Personal Defect,” “External Habit,” and affectation, he 
identifies the processes by which we come to have certain appearances or behaviors as crucial to 
their definitions: 
Humour I take, either to be born with us, and so of a Natural Growth; or else to be 
grafted into us, by some accidental change in the Constitution, or revolution of the Internal 
Habit of Body; by which it becomes, if I may so call it, Naturaliz’d. 
 Humour is from Nature, Habit from Custom; and Affectation from Industry. 
 Humour, shews us as we are. 
 Habit, shews us, as we appear, under a forcible Impression. 
 Affectation, shews what we would be, under a Voluntary Disguise. 
 Tho here I would observe by the way, that a continued Affectation, may in time 
become a Habit. (2011b, 180) 
We can see here that humour is a part of our bodily composition, in line with general medical 
definitions of the humours prevailing at the time. So Congreve observes that “sometimes, Mens 
Humours may be opposed when there is really no specific Difference between them; only a 
greater proportion of the same, in one than t’other; occasion’d by his having more Flegm, or 
Choller, or whatever the Constitution is, from whence their Humours derive their Source” (184).  
 Congreve describes the relationship of the humors to the self: 
Our Humour has relation to us, and to what proceeds from us, as the Accidents have to a 
Substance; it is a Colour, Taste, and Smell, diffused thro’ all; tho’ our Actions are never so 
many, and different in Form, they are all Splinters of the same Wood, and have naturally 
                                                                                                                                                              
type of affectation in his dedication to The Virtuoso (1676). Congreve’s letter to Dennis in 1695 
is really an extended refutation of Shadwell’s argument. 
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one Complexion; which tho’ it may be disguised by Art, yet cannot be wholly changed: We 
may paint it with other Colours, but we cannot change the Grain. So the natural Sound of 
an Instrument will be distinguish’d, tho’ the Notes expressed by it, are never so various, 
and the Diversions never so many. (181) 
He draws here on the common understanding of the relation between substance and accidents: 
accidents are the tangible evidence of substance that, taken together, form our working idea of a 
thing. For Congreve, our “accidents,” the expressions of our natural humor, are simply the 
external evidence of our essential selves. More interestingly, however, Congreve reflects on 
Locke’s comparison, in his chapter “Of Identity and Diversity” (II.xxii) in the Essay, of a person 
to a tree. This chapter, perhaps Locke’s best-known chapter, deals with personal identity. He uses 
the analogy of an oak tree to make two key points: first, that living beings have a different kind 
of identity from “Masses of Matter” (330; II.xxii.3), and second, that human identity must 
necessarily have a bodily component (331-2; II.xxii.6). Congreve’s insistence, then, that our 
“Actions” are “Splinters of the same Wood,” and that they participate in our “Complexion” or 
humor, is not simply an argument for a consistency of character representation – recall that this is 
a how-to for playwrights, and much of Congreve’s purpose is to instruct us on how to write 
characters in which the “Manner” is “adapted to the Humour” (2011b, 180) – it is also an 
argument for the significance of bodily continuity in determining the self. Here, as in Locke’s 
essay, we can know one person from another, in spite of “Art” or “paint,” by virtue of the 
“organized Body” which allows us to connect the “Embryo” to the “Man” without confusing him 
with “Seth, Ismael, Socrates, Pilate, St. Austin [Augustine], [or] Caesar Borgia” (Locke 1975, 
332; II.xxii.6). Typically, Congreve moves the comparison from the natural world to artificial 
creation. Where Locke’s analogy is a tree, Congreve’s is a musical instrument. The reshaping of 
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Locke’s analogy underlines the significance of definitions of the self in art and aesthetics. 
Splinters and sounds, bodies and aesthetic productions, emerge out of “the same Wood.” 
Fundamentally, humors ground us in the body, providing a stable basis for self that links action 
and person, aesthetic instrument and aesthetic product, the self in one guise to the self in another.  
Congreve is also influenced by Ben Jonson’s more specific understanding of humors 
comedy as a genre that displays bodily pathologies  “by metaphor . . . As when some one 
peculiar quality / Doth so possess a man that it doth draw / All his affects, his spirits, and his 
powers / In their confluxions all to run one way” (Jonson 2001, 118; ll.101-6, my emphasis). 
Though humor is clearly about temperament, and Congreve’s definition absorbs Jonson’s 
abstraction of humor from physiological disorder to metaphorical representation, he seems, in the 
letter to Dennis, to understand the source of the humors to be unequivocally physiological, of the 
natural constitution or of the “Internal Habit of Body.” “Dissimulation,” he argues, “may by 
Degrees, become more easy to our practice; but it can never absolutely Transubstantiate us into 
what we would seem: It will always be in some proportion a Violence upon Nature” (2011b, 69). 
Congreve’s use of the term “transubstantiate” is careful; a point of serious theological contention 
in the period, it means specifically a shift from one material substance to another. Again, he 
suggests that our consistent identity inheres in our material beings.  
Affectation is defined in opposition to humor: if humor is “from Nature,” affectation is 
conversely self-made: “from Industry.” Affectation is to humor as a “voluntary Disguise” is to 
the self, as the mask is to reality, as artifice is to nature.19 This seemingly straightforward 
distinction is undermined, however, by Congreve’s final caveat: “a continued Affectation may in 
time become a Habit.”  We know that “Habit is from Custom,” but we also know that a 
                                                 
19 See Holland 1959, 61-2. Holland reads Congreve’s purpose as, in the end, to expose the 
“nature” beneath the affected mask. 
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“revolution” in the “Habit of Body” can “naturalize” a habit such that it becomes a humor. That 
this aside makes the distinction between affectation and humor (or affectation and nature) 
unsustainable is a fact of which Congreve is well aware. In Love for Love, Valentine declares: “I 
know no effectual Difference between continued Affectation and Reality” (1967, 254; III.i.40-1). 
Affectation is really the borrowing of another identity, an extraneous behavior, that comes to be 
more or less successfully incorporated into the self. The appropriative move of affectation may 
then be reluctantly associated with other kinds of mimicry: sympathetic imitation, moral 
emulation, mimetic art. Affectation models for us the empiricist self.  
In his dedication to the Way of the World, Congreve reflects that the grossness of the 
usual run of comic characters “mov’d me to design some Characters, which should appear 
ridiculous not so much thro’ a natural Folly (which is incorrigible, and therefore not proper for 
the stage) as thro’ an affected Wit; a Wit, which at the same time that it is affected, is also false” 
(1967, 390). Here, Congreve is not simply shifting the ideal target of satire from humor to 
affectation, but also implying that the only appropriate targets of satire are affected characters. If 
“natural Folly” is “incorrigible,” and thus not proper for the stage, then surely any incorrigible 
quality, any quality natural to or coeval with the self, is also less than ideal as a satiric target. The 
only adequate targets are redeemable; in other words, good satiric targets are those whose vices 
can be separated from the self and cast out or cast off.  
Hypocrisy, quite the opposite of humor, might seem then to be the perfect satiric target. It 
should be possible to reconcile it with a theory of humors comedy, as Jonson had in the 
hypocritical figure of Mosca in Volpone (1606). But it is through his exploration of hypocrisy 
that Congreve’s notion of individual personality defined by humor begins to show its faultlines. 
Humor and hypocrisy, he discovers, both rely on an intransigent material self, analogous, ideally, 
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to the eternal order of the universe, and incompatible with Lockean sensationalism. Hypocrisy is 
the theme of The Double-Dealer in 1693. The double nature of Maskwell, Congreve’s villain, 
rather heavy-handedly thematizes the play, driving home, by contrast, the singleness, solidity, 
and coherence of ordinary identity. Lady Touchwood, in a speech that literalizes Maskwell’s 
doubleness, condemns him as “a sedate, a thinking Villain . . . one, who is no more moved with 
the reflection of his Crimes, than of his Face; but walks unstartled from the Mirrour, and streight 
forgets the hideous form” (2011c, I.i.328-32: p.135-6). Maskwell’s easy separation into monster 
and mask makes for dull incorrigibility, in the end, and Congreve’s experiment with hypocrisy 
only reveals the limitations of theorizing the self as form and reflection or nature and mask: 
Maskwell takes the mask and leaves his “hideous form” behind. Maskwell’s best-known line – 
“No Mask like open Truth to cover Lies,/ As to go naked is the best disguise” (190; V.i.100-1) – 
calls attention to Congreve’s self-conscious theorizing, in which the easy satiric affiliation 
between external appearance, performance and falseness is already on shaky ground.20 While art 
tells us lies in order to reveal the truth, Maskwell tells the truth to perpetuate a falsehood. Instead 
of explaining it, Maskwell’s hypocrisy overturns the function of art. Congreve’s early fascination 
with hypocritical doubling in The Double-Dealer sets the stage for the way in which doubling in 
the end both constitutes and paradoxically undermines the humoral model of the self. The 
unraveling of Congreve’s commitment to humors comedy is clearest in his acerbic response to 
Jeremy Collier’s Short View (1698), the Amendments of Mr. Collier’s False and Imperfect 
                                                 
20 Laura Brown observes that Maskwell “mak[es] not only his own face, but truth itself 
impervious to assessment” (1981, 127), and Aubrey Williams notes that Congreve self-
consciously invokes the etymology of hypocrisy – “acting of a part on the stage, feigning, 
pretence” (OED, s.v. “hypocrisy”) – to signal his constant awareness of the world-stage 
metaphor (1979, 109). I owe thanks to an anonymous external reader here, who helped me sort 
through the relationship between exteriority and hypocrisy.  
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Citations, in which the separation of hypocritical halves into inside and outside, essence and 
mask, truth and lies, is less and less sure.   
The Amendments reiterates Congreve’s fascination with the doubled self, yoking it to his 
understanding of how satire operates as a genre. In the Amendments, Congreve imagines Collier 
divided in two: a performing Collier and an observing Collier. This double-Collier is a figure for 
Congreve’s audience more generally, revealing the effects as well as the mechanics of satire. 
Congreve’s double-Collier shows us how satire models the fundamental operations of the mind. 
The Amendments stages a satirical mini-comedy, inviting us to “take a slight Sketch of [Mr. 
Collier] as he presents himself to us in his Book. Let Mr. Collier be represented as he is, not as 
he ought to be; that by seeing what he is, Mr. Collier may be asham’d of what he is, and 
endeavour at what he ought to be” (2011a, 3: 78). This is, of course, the function of satirical 
comedy. Satire sketches us out for our amendment; we are the objects of our own satirical gazes. 
But Congreve takes this self-observation and makes it yet more literal. “And that the Instruction 
of the Representation may not be lost, let us borrow that Distinction which severs the Priest from 
the Man,” i.e., the distinction that allows the man to misbehave without sullying the reputation of 
the priest. Collier and his ilk are thus already divided in their hypocrisy, argues Congreve – he is 
just profiting by a pre-existing inconsistency. “Our Author being thus divided,” he continues, 
“we will desire the better Part of him, to take his Place in the Pit, and let the other appear to him 
like his evil Genius on the Stage” (3: 79). Congreve narrates a series of actions and reactions on 
the part of “Mr. Collier on the Stage” and “Mr. Collier, in the Pit,” culminating in Collier on the 
stage destroying poetry with his ignorance of its rules, and Collier in the pit reformed by his own 
bad example.   
 13 
Congreve’s satirical portrait of Collier is an extreme version of the self doubled by 
hypocrisy. In twinning Collier, however, Congreve takes his cue from Locke’s famous definition 
of wit: 
Wit l[ies] most in the assemblage of ideas . . . Judgment, on the contrary, lies quite 
on the other side, in separating carefully, one from another, Ideas, wherein can be 
found the least difference, thereby to avoid being misled by Similitude, and by 
affinity to take one thing for another. This is a way of proceeding quite contrary to 
Metaphor and Allusion, wherein, for the most part, lies that entertainment and 
pleasantry of Wit, which strikes so lively on the Fancy.  
(1975, 156-7; II.xi.2) 
Locke’s definition relies on the doubleness of metaphor, but implies a much larger mental system 
of fragmented impressions: an “assemblage of ideas.” And where wit makes similes, marrying 
ideas together, judgement makes distinctions. Judgement is the capacity to separate the halves of 
a metaphor, to know tenor from vehicle. Thus Congreve writes: 
A Metaphor is a similitude in a Word, a short Comparison; and it is used as a 
similitude, to illustrate and explain the meaning. The Variety of Ideas in the Mind, 
furnish it with a variety of Matter for Similitudes; and those Ideas are only so 
many Impressions made on the Memory, by the force and frequency of external 
Objects. 
 Pitiful and mean Comparisons, proceed from pitiful and mean Ideas; and 
such Ideas have their beginning from a familiarity with such Objects. From this 
Author’s poor and filthy Metaphors and Similitudes, we may learn the filthiness 
of his Imagination; and from the Uncleanness of that, we may make a reasonable 
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guess at . . . those Objects with which he has been most conversant and familiar. 
(2011a, 85-6)  
Here, the objects that press on the mind are manipulated into alignment, as if the mind is a 
collection of their afterimages: “Matter for Similitudes.” While Locke is notoriously allergic to 
metaphor, associating truth and reason with our ability to distinguish, rather than to join ideas, 
Congreve’s picture of the psyche looks like a collection of mental objects waiting to be set side-
by-side in poetical formation. His view of the way the mind orders ideas suggests a constant 
pairing or doubling of terms, and Collier’s mind, clearly its own filthy place, reveals itself in its 
metaphors. Collier’s reformation as a critic requires that he eject the ugly mental objects that 
crowd his mind. Congreve’s satire, then, enacts its splitting move at the most fundamental level 
of mental operations. Collier-on-the-stage, acting as his own “evil Genius,” is a kind of bad 
simile for Collier-in-the-pit. The divided Collier is really conceived at the level of language.  
Fredric Bogel has argued that satire performs the socio-cultural work of scapegoating, 
and thus that what he calls “the difference satire makes” is really the “difference between readers 
and themselves” (2001, 113). Bogel’s argument suggests that the casting-out performed by satire 
is an anthropological constant, but Congreve’s new empiricist vision of the self in the 
Amendments shifts both the content and the method of abjection. The self described in the 
Amendments seems to copy and contain a much larger picture of the world. In pressing the 
doubleness of hypocrisy to its logical extreme in the jostling similes that constitute his version of 
the Lockean self, Congreve manages to undermine the logic of doubling with which he began. 
The neat inversion of the function of art that Maskwell’s hypocrisy represents is here replaced by 
a self made up of interdependent terms that split to comment on one another and re-form in the 
potentially infinite alignments of metaphor. This is an empiricist mental order that suggests 
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associations among fragments of the self rather than a simple duality. While hypocrisy continues 
to be a target of Congreve’s satire, especially the generalized hypocrisy of all social relations, his 
target is less frequently the malice of a Maskwell or a Fainall, and more often the affectations of 
a Witwoud or even a Millamant.  
Hypocrisy and affectation are not easily distinguished, but Congreve is not the only one 
to find affectation the better comic target as the century drew on.21 Hypocrisy consistently drew 
critical fire, but debates about it not infrequently came down on the side of moderate 
pretension.22 In Henry Fielding’s Modern Husband (1732), for example, Mr. Bellamant discusses 
the emptiness of a fashionable church with the foppish Lord Richly. Bellamant says, “This is, I 
believe, the only Age that has scorn’d a Pretence to Religion.” Lord Richly responds: “Then it is 
the only Age that hath scorn’d Hypocrisy.” Bellamant replies, “Rather, that Hypocrisy is the only 
Hypocrisy it wants” (2007, 2: 235). Where the options are hypocritical church-going or no 
church-going at all, essentially, hypocrisy is the better course. The Modern Husband is generally 
a darkly comic exposure of eighteenth-century society’s multifarious hypocrisies, but here, 
emulation does not have to be sincere in order to serve a social purpose.  
In his preface to Joseph Andrews (1742), Fielding categorized affectation as a subset of 
hypocrisy, arguing that affected persons were divided between two camps, the vain and the 
hypocrites, of which the vain were guilty of the more venial form of affectation. The “vain Man 
hath not the Virtue he affects, to the degree he would be thought to have it; yet it sits less 
aukwardly on him than on the [hypocrite] who is the very Reverse of what he would seem to be” 
(1970, 7). The point at which the lesser degree of virtue becomes “the very Reverse” is unclear, 
                                                 
21 For Stuart Tave, the move toward the correction of affectation, which counts as a folly rather 
than a vice, is part of the increasing humanization of eighteenth-century culture (1960, 98-99).  
22 For a study of the way in which hypocrisy, once a political tool, comes to be naturalized and 
feminized as a moral strategy over the course of the eighteenth century, see Davidson 2004. 
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as Fielding admits (6). There is a continuum on which vanity may be distinguished from absolute 
vice, rather than a sharp distinction between the two. Hypocrisy and affectation are matters of 
degree rather than of kind. Nonetheless, he insists: “as they proceed from very different Motives, 
so they are as clearly distinct in their Operations” (6-7). The “Affectation which arises from 
Vanity is nearer to Truth than the other,” which is characterized by the hypocrite’s struggle with 
a “violent Repugnancy of Nature” (7). The “very Reverse” of nature that defines hypocrisy still 
occupies a category apart from the absorption of feeling that increasingly comes to define 
affectation. Tellingly, to feign “nearer to Truth” could as easily be a definition of the aims of 
Fielding’s new realism as it is his definition of an affected character. In contrast, Maskwell uses 
“Truth to cover Lies” (190; V.i.100). Affectation mimics truth while hypocrisy inverts it. 
In 1753, Hogarth observed that ordinarily, character is written on the face “by the natural 
and unaffected movements of the muscles, caused by the passions of the mind” (1997, 96). 
Though he qualifies this statement by noting that different causes may produce the same 
expressions, that facial conformation may change the “marks” of the passions, and last and most 
importantly, that continued affectation might change facial expressions (96), he nonetheless sets 
hypocrisy apart as a separate category by which all natural expression is overturned. While 
“expressions of the countenance,” despite these qualifications, provide a “description of the 
language written” in the mind, “the character of an hypocrite is entirely out of the power of the 
pencil” (96). Hypocrisy confounds the process of art itself, interfering not simply with the 
drawing of external expression, but also with a coherent narrative of identity. Like Fielding, 
Hogarth sees hypocrisy as the “very Reverse” of nature. However, he also sees the potential for 
affectation to change nature. Affectation might permanently mark the self, while hypocrisy 
remains a separable mask, interfering both with nature and with the legibility of its coded 
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gestures. For Hogarth, hypocrisy has a status outside, beyond, even directly overturning the 
purposes of art. Both of these highly influential practitioners of narrative take Congreve’s 
distinction to be valid. Affectation is emulation that might mark the mimic while hypocrisy 
maintains a clear distinction, a “violent Repugnancy” between the mimic and his mask.  
From Affectation to Sympathy: 
The way sympathy functions later in the century echoes the fluidity of Congreve’s 
distinction between inside and outside, his readily atomized self, and his insistence on a 
mimicking or mirroring process of self-making. Adam Smith writes that when we feel for 
someone, “we enter as it were into his body” (2002, 12), and that the passions “may seem to be 
transfused from one man to another” (13). Smith is clear that this is simply an illusion, but 
nonetheless, that the emotional responses of our society act as a “looking-glass” (130) in which 
we are forced to examine our own behavior and which we use as a method of moral regulation.  
Neither Hogarth nor Fielding suggest an explicit link between sympathy and affectation, 
though their interest in the confusions of self and other that characterize both seems to hint at the 
possibility. Neil Saccamano’s discussion of Hume’s theory of taste, however, allows us to see the 
similarity of their underlying logic. He argues that Hume’s ideas about taste anticipate his larger 
argument about sympathy. Integral to Hume’s aesthetic theory, he observes, is the notion of 
“self-parting,” a “displacement” of the individual for the position of another that presumes the 
displacement of the self already to be constitutive of selfhood. Thus he writes: “To be a particular 
person is to be moved toward others in a way that both supports and unsettles the presumption of 
autonomous identity” (2006, 184). The simultaneous mimicry and displacement of self-parting is 
fully articulated in the concept of affectation, which is, by definition, a performance predicated 
upon a sympathetic repositioning. In Hume, Saccamano argues, we see the formation of the 
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subject in the process of its sympathetic movement towards another subject-position. In this 
empiricist model, as in Locke’s, the self is constituted by an absorption and replication of the 
world, but here, sympathy is essential to subject-formation. Saccamano’s argument allows us to 
see the way in which sympathy’s intersubjective logic unites empiricist narratives of self with 
emotional dispositions. I want to suggest that the comic treatment of affectation, particularly in 
Congreve’s criticism, anticipates the self-parting of sympathy, exposing the origins of the 
insertion of the passions into empiricist discourse. Affectation and sympathy are nearly 
indistinguishable. While sympathy absorbs and replicates emotion, affectation is a performance 
of otherness that equally absorbs the other into the self. These affective methods of constituting 
the self suggest that interpersonal mimicry is inevitably integral to the mimetic self envisioned by 
empiricism. 
This interpersonal mimicry takes us, not simply away from hypocrisy and humor and 
toward affectation and its cognitive correlate, empiricism, but also toward the old seventeenth-
century territory of the passions. Daniel Larlham observes, of Malebranche’s influential theories 
of emotion, that they posit an “imitative-affective disposition” (2012, 439); Jacqueline Miller 
notes of Renaissance emotions that “it is the nature of passions – in particular their mimetic 
properties and their transferability – to create similitude” (2001, 418); and most recently, Brian 
Cummings and Freya Sierhuis have introduced their collection on the passions with the 
observation that early modern ideas of emotion incorporate a “mimetic language of the passions” 
(2013, 7). These critics all point out the central importance of the imitative function of the 
passions. Inherent in the early modern model of the self is the idea that passions are infectious, 
and that emotions create in us an imitative tendency. Nancy Armstrong and Leonard 
Tennenhouse have argued that, with Locke, “[m]odern theories of the emotions began as a 
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refutation of the humoral model of the passions” (2006, 132). Somewhat counterintuitively, 
however, there is no “humoral model of the passions.” The passions and the humors are separate 
somatic systems. For the most part, they occupy separate discursive spaces, with the passions 
occupying the more theoretical space, treated by moral philosophers: Descartes, Hobbes, 
Malebranche, and Spinoza, as well as lesser-known seventeenth-century moral and natural 
philosophers like Jean François Seneault, at the beginning of the seventeenth century, and Walter 
Charleton at the end. It is true, however, that even in medical terminology, the humors had fallen 
out of favor by the end of the seventeenth century. They were simply assumed as the background 
to new models of the body driven by mechanical anatomy, some by Cartestian mechanism, 
others by Newtonian physics.23 William Cowper’s Myotomia (1724), for example, deliberately 
rejected Descartes for Newton, and attempted a lengthy mathematical and physical proof that the 
muscles are a sort of pulley system operated by mechanistic forces. In some ways, the common 
                                                 
23 A 1640 text by a man with the unlikely name of Nicholas Abraham de la Framboisière offers a 
quick guide to self-diagnosis: An easy Method to know the Causes and Signs of the Humour most 
ruleth in the Body, and to avoid thereby things hurtful. A sanguine temperament, for example, 
reveals “manners of mind pleasant and sweet, calm and gentle: For a temperate and mild 
disposition of mind, is a mark of a temperate habit of body” (2). A choleric temperament can be 
diagnosed, helpfully, by “The hair yellow, for yellow hair is the dreggy excrement of yellow 
Choler” (3). A cheap pamphlet, this is really just the WebMD of its day, and speaks to a general 
cultural investment in the humors, rather than to current seventeenth-century medicine, which 
was occupied with innovations based on the relatively new science of anatomy. Better-known 
texts like John Bulwer’s Pathomyotomia (London, 1640) and Thomas Willis’s Five Treatises 
(London, 1681) combine new scholarly work on anatomy and the passions with assumptions 
about the motive power of the humors. Willis, for example, alternates between defining humors 
according to the Galenic model, as substances associated with temperamental imbalances, and 
defining them more generally as mobile substances with particular qualities. So drink, by 
ingestion, becomes a humor: “the humor, or liquid substance daily taken” (2), while 
“Atrabilious” and “Atrabiliary” are defined as “Belonging to the black Bile or melancholy, or to 
the melancholic humour.” (“Table of all the hard words”). Bulwer barely mentions the humors, 
but assumes their underlying significance: the “materiall caus” of knitted brows in grief, he says, 
is “a melancholly humour affected and kindled with much heat, which sends up a salt vapour to 
the Face, which pluckes the Muscles of the Forehead” (147-48). We can see here that humors are 
falling out of fashion as a method of medical diagnosis and treatment, but are still a key element 
of eighteenth-century popular medicine as well as of characterology, both literary and otherwise.  
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go-to text for seventeenth-century scholars of the passions, Thomas Wright’s Passions of the 
Minde in Generall (1604),24 is a departure both from the new emphasis on anatomy and from the 
late sixteenth-century norm exemplified by Rudolph Goclenius, Laurent Joubert, and Johannes 
Knauer. These physicians and natural philosophers tended to taxonomize the passions and 
examine their physiology after the classical model laid out by Aristotle in the Rhetoric, Cicero in 
his Orator, and Lucretius in De Rerum Natura.25 None discuss the humors. Wright’s treatment of 
both systems in the one treatise was somewhat unusual, though he was followed in this by Marin 
Cureau de la Chambre.26 Both Wright’s and Cureau de la Chambre’s treatises on the passions 
were widely influential and much reprinted in the period. But even Wright, though he argued that 
the passions could affect the humors, altering the bodily constitution, maintained a firm 
separation between the systems. Where the passions occupied a place “betwixt witte and wille 
and sense” (1604, 7), partaking of both, the humors belonged solely to the body, despite the fact 
that their expression could manifest as personal peculiarity. The humors “wait upon the 
Passions” (4). 
It is common in current criticism not to distinguish firmly between the humors and the 
passions.27 They frequently appear as equal parts of a single system, indistinguishably 
participants in both physiological and psychological aspects of the early modern self. Joseph 
Roach brilliantly argues that the eighteenth-century move toward a mechanistic, Cartesian model 
                                                 
24 The first, shorter edition of Wright’s Passions of the Minde was published in 1601. 
25 See Goclenius, Physiologia de Risu et Lacrumis (1597). Goclenius insists both on the 
healthiness of laughter (16) and on its physiological and non-physiological causes (17-20). See 
also Joubert, Treatise on Laughter (1579); Knauer, De Risu (1607); and Iossii, De Voluptate et 
Dolore, de Risu et Fletu, Somno et Vigilia (1603). Knauer argues that laughter originates in the 
brain and the diaphragm (61). The first edition of Knauer’s text was published undated and 
anonymously.  
26 Cureau de la Chambre, Characters (1649). 
27 See, e.g., introduction to Selleck 2008 and Miller 2001 
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of the body involved dispensing with the humors (1985, 80). But he also argues that the humors 
were previously understood to activate as well as to be upset by the passions (39). To this end, he 
cites Wright’s Passions of the Minde, as well as Bulwer’s Pathomyotomia (1649). He quotes 
Wright’s index: “How do humours of the body stirre up Passions. . . . Or, why do Passions 
engender corporal humors” (Wright 1604, 306; Roach 1985, 29, my emphasis). Though Wright 
here suggests that humors might influence the passions, he insists in the body of the treatise that 
passions are “actes of the sensitive power, or facultie of our soule” or “a sensual motion of our 
appetitive facultie, through imagination of some good or ill thing” which “alter the humours of 
our bodies,” and that “passions then be certaine internall actes or operations of the soule, 
bordering upon reason and sense … causing … some alteration in the body” (1604, 8). While 
Wright may seem to us to be splitting hairs (the passions are sensual appetites having to do with 
the soul and the imagination as well as the body; the humors are emphatically corporeal), the 
distinction was significant and frequently echoed in the period.28 Roach sees the passions as 
essential to mechanistic models of the self in the eighteenth century; I think the passions are 
essential modifiers of empiricist self-making.  
Congreve’s work reveals a moment in which the two models – the humors and the 
passions – are in contention, and he also reveals the deciding factor in the contest: the passions 
align themselves more easily with an empiricist model of the self. The passions come to 
dominate eighteenth-century discourses of emotion29 first, because they take us farther from the 
                                                 
28 Angus Gowland has recently taken issue with this critical habit. He disarticulates the humors 
from the passions, and cites the passage from Wright, above, to support his claim that “no early 
modern writer . . . gave [an] . . . account of the passions which reduced them to the status of 
purely physical effects of the humours and the spirits” (2013, 89). 
29 See Rorty 1982 and Roach 1985. 
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body than do the humors,30 and second, because they emphasize the impressionable, imitative 
self. Empiricist epistemology grounds knowledge in the material body, so this claim may appear 
contradictory. What Congreve shows us, however, is that empiricism is equally about the 
impressibility of the self, its availability to the experience, not simply of objects, but also of its 
social and affective environment.  
I want to return in this section to Congreve’s letter to Dennis, “Concerning Humour in 
Comedy,” in order to make a different point: that Congreve is, in spite of himself, as invested in 
the passions as he is in humor. This letter, though it appears to come down firmly on the side of 
humors comedy, in the end initiates a theoretical trajectory that ends with the faint but 
reverberative suggestion of an alignment between comic affectation and sympathy. In his letter to 
Dennis, Congreve maintains the distinct roles of the passions and the humors in mental 
organization, but treats them as tightly interdependent systems, operating synchronically. The 
passions, in most philosophical and popular iterations, are still, at the turn of the eighteenth 
century, closely related to their etymological origin in the Latin deponent, patior, “to suffer.” 
They are, though with increasing difficulty after Descartes’ Passions of the Soul (1649), tied to 
passivity.31 He distinguishes passions from humors thus: “I dont doubt, but you have observed 
several Men Laugh when they are Angry; others who are Silent; some that are Loud: Yet I cannot 
suppose that it is the passion of Anger which is in it self different, or more or less in one than 
t’other; but that it is the Humour of the Man that is Predominant, and urges him to express it in 
                                                 
30 As Dixon observes, some kinds of passions, “moral sentiments and affections, were potentially 
rational as well as being warm and lively states of mind” (2006, 64). 
31 In 1621 Nicholas Coeffeteau struggled to manage the apparent contradiction between the 
visible effects of the passions and their theoretically passive nature: “the word Passion is taken 
here for a change, which is made in man, contrary to his naturall constitution and disposition, 
from the which hee is as it were wrested by this change. In which sense the Phylosophers say, 
that things suffer, when as they are drawne from their naturall disposition, to a course that is 
contrary to their nature” (1621, 20). On passivity and the passions, see also James 1997. 
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that manner” (2011b, 69).32 Passions, for Congreve, are shared, universal, and stable; their 
expression, in contrast, is dictated by humor. At least theoretically, the humoral system moves 
behavior and emotion in the opposite direction to the movement of the passions. Passions are 
responses to sensations that have moved inward across the boundary of the body to the mind; 
humors are peculiarities of bodily constitution that have moved outward across the boundary of 
the body to make themselves felt in the world. Passions press in; humors act out.33 
Congreve’s precision in defining humor and distinguishing it from passion appears all the 
more deliberate when we take Dryden’s loose definition of humor into account: “among the 
English . . . by humour is meant some extravagant habit, passion, or affection; particular . . . to 
some one person: by the oddness of which, he is immediately distinguish’d from the rest of men” 
(1971, 60-1). Dryden also observes, however, that Jonson was not inclined “to move the 
Passions; . . . Humour was his proper Sphere” (57). Congreve’s more theoretical bent commits 
him to the passivity and impressibility of the self. His work moderates empiricist models in two 
essential ways: he makes it clear that the empiricist model of cognition emerges out of 
preexisting literary and linguistic models, and he makes it impossible to separate empiricism and 
emotion.  
                                                 
32 This description of passions altered in their expression according to the humor of the 
individual echoes Wright’s claim that “the same passion affecteth diuers persons in diuers 
manners” according to their predominant humor (1604, 37). See also Paster’s discussion of 
Wright’s claim in the service of a somewhat different argument (2004, 14-7). 
33 The difficulty of maintaining this theoretical position while still arguing for the codification of 
the passions as physiognomic signifiers of mental states is clear in Marin Cureau de la 
Chambre’s popular treatise, The Characters of the Passions, translated in 1649 and much 
reprinted in England. Cureau de la Chambre attempts to solve the problem by separating the 
passions (inward agitations) from the characters of the passions (external expressions caused by 
spirits expelled from the soul): “the essence of human actions consists in the inward emotion 
which the object forms in the appetite . . . So anger is nothing but a desire of Vengeance; and in 
the pursuit of that emotion, the soul produceth exterior actions, which may serve to this purpose . 
. . which we call Characters because they express and discover the alteration and interior motion 
of the appetite” (1649, 4-5).  
 24 
He goes on in the letter to discuss responses to pleasure: according to their humor, one 
person “hugs himself alone, and thinks it an Addition to the pleasure to keep it Secret. Another is 
upon Thorns till he has made Proclamation of it” (2011b, 69). Pleasure is not a passion proper, 
observes Locke, but rather one of the “hinges on which our Passions turn.”34 The passion itself – 
joy? – thus manifests according to humor, and humor locates the passion inside or outside the 
body. Congreve then examines grief, and last, love, which is best judged by “the Ladies who 
abound in Servants” (70). Love leads him to theorize the humors of women, and to conclude that, 
in fact, they haven’t any. “Perhaps,” he speculates, “Passions are too powerful in that Sex, to let 
Humour have its Course” (70). The pressure of the passions blocks the course of the humors: 
they cannot be externalized in the passive female economy. Indeed, he continues, “if ever any 
thing does appear Comical or Ridiculous in a Woman, I think it is little more than an acquir’d 
Folly, or an Affectation” (70). In women, affectation replaces humor. The passions, which are 
universal, are moderated in their expression by the humors, and so Congreve’s construction is 
suggestive in several different ways: first, it argues for greater uniformity among women than 
men; second, it suggests that personality and passion are mutually exclusive, so that persons 
dominated by passion are less, rather than more, individualized; third, it implies that humors, 
naturalized to men, are less pathological than passions; last, and most interestingly, it suggests 
that Congreve, in his shift to affectation as the major target of his satire, came to understand this 
feminine psychic economy as more generally representative than the humorous, masculine 
economy.35  
In some ways, in fact, he had got there earlier. In Love for Love, Congreve compares 
                                                 
34 Essay 1975, 229; II.xx.3. 
35 This is particularly interesting in light of Paster’s (2004) argument that discourses of the 
humors in Renaissance drama often served to reinforce claims to male individuation and 
individuality. See chapter four, “Belching Quarrels.” 
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women to Locke’s tabula rasa – “white Paper, void of all Characters, without any Ideas” (1967, 
104; II.i.2) – but he also makes this comparison in The Double-Dealer. Lady Plyant compares 
herself to “a fair Sheet of Paper” (145; II.i.259-60), and Angelica, “a Woman” is “all white, a 
sheet of lovely spotless Paper, when you first are Born” (292; IV.i.634-8). Again, Congreve 
conflates an empiricist model of the mind with much older ways of thinking about how we 
manage personality. Women’s impressibility here is figured both as virginal innocence destined 
to be stained, and as the ultimate representation of the Lockean impressible mind, the record of 
conscious experience that makes a self. This representative mental state of blankness is both 
vaguely insulting and profoundly idealizing. If we are all made to be written upon, we are all 
books of the world, collections of experiences, and most importantly, records of our relations 
with others.  
 Congreve’s championing of a masculinized concept of humors in the letter “Concerning 
Humour” seems subtly to quarrel with Dennis’s view of the passions. In an earlier letter to 
Congreve that was part of this exchange, Dennis wrote: “to touch a Passion is the surest way to 
Delight. For nothing Agitates like it. Agitation is the health and Joy of the Soul” (1964, 175). In 
Congreve’s response, the curative properties Dennis assigns to the agitation of the passions are 
ignored in favor of the moral value of humor, which, he says, is “almost of English Growth,” and 
is produced in England by “the great Freedom, Privilege, and Liberty which the Common People 
of England enjoy. Any Man that has a Humour, is under no restraint, or fear of giving it Vent” 
(2011b, 71). Despite the fact that Congreve is only equivocally approving of this liberty of the 
common people, and that he suggests that men are more humorous than women because their 
“Follies are Stronger, and [their] Faults are more prevailing” (70), he nonetheless clings to a 
model of English comedy that privileges peculiarity over passion. Where Dennis sees passion, in 
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the uniformity of its impact, as both curative and sociable – i.e. building connections between 
author and audience, audience-member and audience-member – Congreve here resists this very 
universalizing power of passion in favor of the sociable potential of individualized humors.   
Derek Hughes argues that Congreve remains deeply committed to individualism, that he 
maintains the privacy and self-determination of “the essence of the individual” (1996, 382). 
Hughes thus contends that Congreve’s satire is reserved for “[t]he legible character,” transparent 
because it is “the one that is written by another hand” (383). When Congreve defines humor and 
affectation, however, he suggests the ease with which we might all overwrite ourselves in the 
hand of another. In his letter to Dennis he explains that the distinction between humor and 
affectation is one of the “Nicest” of the series of distinctions he makes between humor and other 
qualities. “Affectation is generally mistaken for Humour,” he explains: 
These are indeed so much alike, that at a Distance, they may be mistaken one for 
the other. For what is Humour in one, may be Affectation in another; and nothing 
is more common, than for some to affect particular ways of saying, and doing 
things, peculiar to others, whom they admire and would imitate. Humour is the 
Life, Affectation the Picture. He that draws a Character of Affectation, shews 
Humour at the Second Hand; he at best but publishes a Translation, and his 
Pictures are but Copies. (2011b, 66) 
The difficulty with affectation is its imitative character. First, affectation is the imitation of some 
behavior “naturally” belonging to another. So, affectation, like a picture, imitates nature. And 
then he who depicts affectation is imitating an imitation. This author “at best but publishes a 
Translation, and his Pictures are but Copies.” Oddly, then, the author who imitates affectation 
becomes like the affected person he depicts. And as a consequence, the imitation of an imitation 
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elevates the original imitator; affectation becomes artistry. The affected character is the author of 
the original text or painting that the dramatist then merely translates or copies. Congreve’s 
resistance to affectation overturns its own logic. In the process of imitating imitation, of painting 
a picture of affectation, Congreve turns away from the peculiarity of humor and towards our 
common passions. In their commonality, Congreve finds a new picture of the mimetic mind and 
a newly powerful way of figuring artistic replication. 
 Deidre Lynch has observed that, in this period, “recognizing a face, or putting a name to a 
face, one replayed what eighteenth-century philosophy of mind valued as the most basic 
cognitive operation: that of discriminating and then weighing samenesses and differences” (1998, 
33). Lynch’s analysis allows us to understand Congreve’s anxiety about affectation, then, as an 
anxiety about the potential for this discriminatory capacity to disappear in the face of copies, 
translations, imitations, and of course, the infinite replicability of typographic “characters.” And 
not coincidentally, translations and copies were very often the tasks of Grub Street hacks or 
engravers paid to pirate the original paintings on display in London shops. Affectation is a kind 
of runaway replication, making true art indistinguishable from the “Translation[s]” and “Copies” 
that have cornered the market,36 true humor impossible to pick out. But what affectation has in 
common with printing, it also has in common with the imprinting effects of the passions. The 
distinction between humors and passions, on which Congreve here insists, is also a defense 
against seventeenth-century theories of the replicability of the passions and the susceptibility of 
the mind to their impressions.  
 When Congreve began his career, feeling had not yet accrued a special status outside and 
apart from artifice and illusion. In the seventeenth century, feeling could itself be a mask, and 
                                                 
36 See Peters 1991, 120. 
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even when they were perceived as true indications of an internal state, the passions belonged as 
much to the surface of the body as to the mind. Passions had particular gestural and expressive 
markers, and might be donned and doffed at will.37 Charles Allen argues, in an essay on the 
transition between classical and Baroque painting, that Charles Le Brun’s concern to figure the 
passions schematically in his 1668 Conférence sur l’expression générale et particulière is a 
response to Descartes’ Passions of the Soul, and that Le Brun’s interest in facial expression 
marks a key turning-point in seventeenth-century notions of the function of art. Le Brun’s 
schematization of the passions – as against the particularity of expression in the painting of 
Nicolas Poussin – aims to replicate the expression of passion over a variety of faces. As Allen 
observes, Le Brun’s interest in “passions considered as immediate corporeal reactions to outside 
stimuli; as atomistic states; as the reactions of isolated individuals” (1998, 89) causes him to 
begin, in history painting, with the bystanders’ reaction to the event, rather than with the “moral, 
metaphysical and poetic significance” of the event itself. Le Brun’s was an educational project, 
too – he envisions a future of infinite replication of the same passions over an infinite variety of 
faces, resisting, as Allen notes, “the modification of affective response by the complex of other 
circumstances surrounding the individual” (87). Allen is critical of what turns out to be Le 
                                                 
37 For a history of the passions in the Renaissance, see Gail Kern Paster’s Humoring the Body; 
for seventeenth-century context, see Michael Schoenfeldt’s Bodies and Selves in Early Modern 
England. The most sophisticated expressions of this new interest in philosophies of the passions 
as the seventeenth century drew on were Descartes’ Les Passions de l’Ame (1649) [The Passions 
of the Soul] in France and the first book of Hobbes’s Leviathan (1651) in England. A series of 
essays and treatises followed  in England, ranging from Walter Charleton’s Natural History of 
the Passions (London, 1674) to John Dennis’s Longinian literary criticism, to Francis 
Hutcheson’s Essay on the Nature and Conduct of the Passions and Affections (1728). Discourses 
of the passions were closely tied to physiology; they were thus easily incorporated by disciplines 
ranging from painting (see Charles Le Brun, Conférence sur l’expression générale et particulaire 
[1667]) to acting (see, e.g., Samuel Foote, A Treatise on the Passions [1747] and Aaron Hill, An 
Essay on the Art of Acting [1749]). For a full treatment of the relationship of seventeenth-century 
discussions of the passions and a new mechanistic physiology to eighteenth-century acting, see 
Roach 1985. 
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Brun’s anti-individualist, ahistorical approach – Le Brun refuses, in Allen’s view, the complexity 
of individualized, singular events, and of individualized, singular persons. Congreve is 
consciously providing an antidote to Le Brun’s schematization of emotion. Le Brun’s system 
graphically inscribes the relatively new seventeenth-century belief in the replicability of affect 
across individuals.38 In 1695, Congreve wishes to preserve the “modification of affective 
response,” not as circumstantial, but rather as natural: the passions are filtered through the 
humors to produce individualized responses.  
Congreve’s resistance to the force of the passions in aesthetic theory, and his preference 
for the more individualistic model of the humors is in the end undermined by his equally strong 
commitment to an empiricist model of the self. This model interferes irreparably with the humors 
model. Congreve’s increasing interest in affectation, an interest that is reiterated by Fielding, 
arguably the most important mid-century theorist of comedy, is a kind of giving way to imitative 
models of the mind. What affectation and passion seem to have in common is commonality itself. 
Affectation makes peculiarity common, and passion makes a commons of individual feeling. 
Both affectation and passion prioritize the impressionable, rather than the expressive self. 
Imitative models, driven by the passions as much as by empiricism, take us away from the fixed 
psychic economy of the humors. Rooted in a stable bodily economy analogous to an ideally 
orderly universe, the humors align us with the elements of the natural world, not with our 
complex social context. Affectation prefigures a malleable psyche determined by sympathetic 
social interaction. But affectation is also an art to make a self. 
 
                                                 
38 While Aristotle’s Rhetorica seems to suggest something like this, as Daniel Gross has pointed 
out, in fact the Rhetorica formulates an idea of the passions that is deeply and carefully socially 
determined and discursively constructed. See Gross 2006.  
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